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Abstract
We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend
on the embedding coalition structure. We introduce a noncooperative,
sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilib-
rium outcomes coincides with the recursive core, a generalisation of
the core to such games. In order to extend past results limited to to-
tally recursive-balanced partition function form games we introduce a
more permissive perfectness concept, subgame-consistency that only
requires perfectness in selected subgames. Due to the externalities,
the profitability of deviations depends on the partition formed by the
remaining players: the stability of core payoff configurations is ensured
by a combination of the pessimism of players going for certain profits
only and the assumption that players base their stationary strategies
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on a made-up history punishing some of the possible deviators – and
getting this sometimes right.
Subject classification: C71, C72
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1 Introduction
The classical theory of coalitional games studied games with orthogonal, iso-
lated coalitions, that can be studied independently of each other. The char-
acteristic function of a TU-game, for instance, assigns a payoff to a coalition
disregarding other players and coalitions. For the usual interpretations of
coalitions, be those trading blocks (Yi, 1996), trusts (Bloch, 1995) or inter-
national environmental agreements (Funaki and Yamato, 1999; Eyckmans
and Tulkens, 2003), the orthogonality assumption is difficult to maintain; we
believe it is the exception rather than the rule that coalitions can be studied
independently of each other.
Since Thrall and Lucas (1963) introduced partition function form games
numerous solution concepts have been proposed to solve cooperative games
with externalities (Chander and Tulkens, 1995; Ray and Vohra, 1997; Hynd-
man and Ray, 2007). A solution concept is well-founded if it is fully charac-
terised by a collection of elementary, usually independent properties, axioms
or if it naturally emerges as the equilibrium of a noncooperative game. Few
concepts for partition function form games have backing of either kind; for the
axiomatic framework see for instance Bloch and van den Nouweland (2014),
here we present an implementation by non-cooperative equilibria.
The implementation of cooperative solution concepts, such as the core in
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charancteristic function form games has an extensive literature (Chatterjee
et al., 1993; Lagunoff, 1994; Perry and Reny, 1994), but these results do not
directly generalise to games with externalities. In this domain Huang and
Sjo¨stro¨m (2006) and Ko´czy (2009) have provided partial results using sequen-
tial coalition formation games that have stationary perfect equilibria. Such
games have non-empty cores in all subgames – a property that does not even
hold for simple TU games. We therefore look for a condition that is weaker
than subgame perfectenss. Subgame-consistency holds for a broader game
class and the set of payoff-configurations generated by subgame-consistent
strategies coincides with the recursive core.
Subgame-consistency is a weaker concept than subgame-perfectness, but
more demanding than time-consistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). The
latter insists only on the consistency of the equilibrium play, subgame-consistency
also requires the perfectness of subgames that are relevant for the stabil-
ity of the equilibrium, at last subgame-perfectness requires it in all sub-
games. Subgame-perfect equilibria are therefore also subgame-consistent and
all subgame-consistent equilibria are also time-consistent. Moreover, station-
ary perfect equilibria are stationary consistent. For more on the relation of
subgame-perfect and time-consistent strategies see Fershtman (1989) and
Asilis (1995).
Unlike Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m (2006) and Ko´czy (2009) we do not assume
a fixed payoff division within coalitions, but allow an endogenous allocation.
In a more recent paper Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m (2010) provide results for the
r-core that closely correspond to ours, but the assumption that the game is
totally r-balanced, that is, the r-core of each residual subgame is non-empty
remains. This difference turns out to be minor compared to the approach
to handle a technical difficulty in the proofs. We explain these differences in
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the conclusion of the paper, after introducing our model.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction a long
second section follows introducing both the cooperative and noncooperative
theories to solve games in partition function form, we introduce the notation
and simple terminology we are going to use. We present the cooperative so-
lution, namely the recursive core and similarly the noncooperative coalition
formation game and its equilibria. A novel equilibrium concept, subgame
consistency and the corresponding notion of relevant subgame are also intro-
duced here. We state and prove our main result in the third section. The
paper ends with a brief conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
Let N denote the set of players. Subsets are called coalitions. A partition
S of S is a splitting of S into disjoint coalitions. Π(S) denotes the set of
partitions of S. In general we use capital and calligraphic letters to denote
a set and its partition (the set of players N being an exception), indexed
capital letters are elements of the partition. We write i ∈ S if there exists Sk
such that i ∈ Sk ∈ S and if i ∈ S we write S(i) for the coalition embedded
in S containing i.
The game (N, V ) is given by a player set N and a partition function
(Thrall and Lucas, 1963) V : Π(N) → (2N → R), where V (Si,S) denotes
the payoff for coalition Si embedded in partition S. In the examples we
will abbreviate partitions; for instance we write [1, 23] for {{1} , {2, 3}}. We
also write V (P) = (V (S1,P), . . . , V (Sk,P)) if P = [S1, . . . , Sk] to denote the
vector of coalitional payoffs embedded in the partition P .
For vectors x, y ∈ RN we write xS for the restriction to the set S and
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xS > yS if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ S ⊂ N and there exists j ∈ S such that xj > yj.
Due to the externalities in the partition function form game the standard
solution concepts do not work; we consider outcomes instead of imputations
and the recursive core (Ko´czy, 2007), a generalisation of the core, as the
solution concept.
The pair ω = (x,P) consisting of a payoff vector x ∈ RN and a partition
P ∈ Π(N) is a payoff configuration (or outcome) if ∑i∈S xi = V (Pi,P) for
all Pi ∈ P . The set of outcomes of game (N, V ) is denoted Ω(N, V ).
Let S ( N and S the partition of S = N \ S. Then the residual game
S, V S is the partition function game played over S such that V S(Si,S) =
V (Si,S ∪ S) for all Si ⊆ S and S ∈ Π(S).
Definition 1 (Recursive core (Ko´czy, 2007)). For a single-player game the
recursive core is trivially defined. Now assume that the core C(N, V ) has
been defined for all games with |N | < k players. Then for an |N |-player
game an outcome (x,P) is dominated if there exists a coalition Q forming
partition Q such that yQ > xQ for all outcomes (y,Q ∪ Q) ∈ Ω(N, V ) such
that (yQ,Q) ∈ C(Q, V Q) if C(Q, V Q) 6= ∅. The core C(N, V ) of (N, V ) is
the set of undominated outcomes.
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Example 1. Consider the following 6-player partition function form game.
V ([123456]) = (12)
V ([i, 123456 \ i]) = (1, 10) ∀i ∈ N
V ([ij, 123456 \ ij]) = (2, 4) ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ N
V ([1, i, 23456 \ i]) = (1, 1, 8) ∀i ∈ N \ {1}
V ([1, 23, 456]) = (1, 6, 3)
V ([1, 23, 4, 56]) = (0, 6, 1, 2)
V ([1, 23, 5, 46]) = (2, 6, 1, 2)
V ([1, 23, 6, 45]) = (3, 2, 1, 2)
V ([1, 23, 4, 5, 6]) = (3, 6, 0, 0, 0)
other payoffs are 0.
A quick inspection of the partition function reveals that the (recursive)
core consists of a single element ((2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2), [123456]). See Appendix A
for the detailed calculations.
Example 2. Consider also a 4-player game ({1, 2, 3, 4} , U), where
U([1234]) = (8)
U([i, jkl]) = (1, 5)
U([ij, kl]) = (4, 4)
U([i, j, kl]) = (1, 1, 4)
U([1, 2, 3, 4]) = (1, 1, 1, 1)
if {i, j, k, l} = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
A quick inspection of the partition function reveals that there are no
deviations that could potentially give higher payoffs than under the payoff
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configuration ((1, 1, 1, 1), [1234]), while it can readily be verified that any pair
can secure a (total) payoff of 4.
Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m’s (2003) r-core coincides with the recursive core on
a broad class of games that does not, however include the standard TU-
games without externalities. Ray’s (2007) standard equilibrium, defined for
symmetric partition function form games has a similar recursive structure.
For an interpretation and the discussion of the properties of the recursive
core see Ko´czy (2007, 2009); Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m (2010).
3 Sequential coalition formation
The sequential coalition formation game we define is similar to Bloch’s (1996)
and Perry and Reny’s (1994). First a player proposes the formation of some
coalitions. The offer specifies not only who should be the members of these
coalitions, but also how the coalitional payoffs will be shared. If all involved
players accept the offer, the coalitions form and leave the game. When the
offer is rejected, a new proposal is made and so on, until all players exit.
3.1 The game
Consider a game (N, V ) with a player set N and partition function V . Time
t is continuous, but we assume that there is always an open time interval
between two actions: there is time to respond. Let Qt ⊆ N denote those
who have already quit the game by time t, forming partition Qt. Player i
can make proposals
P ti =
(P t, wt)
∣∣∣∣∣∣P t ∈ Π(P t), P t ⊆ Qt, P t 3 i, wt ∈ RP t ,∀P tk ∈ P t
∑
j∈P tk
wtj = 1

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the current proposer is it making the proposal pt = (P t, wt) to the players
in P t, already accepted by the players in At ⊆ P t (we assume it ∈ At) have
already accepted the proposal. At t a player i can
1. accept the proposal pt if i ∈ P t,
2. make a new proposal, or
3. do nothing.
The strategy σi of a player i specifies a complete protocol of actions for all
times and contingencies during the game and σti the action at t. Let σ denote
the strategy profile collecting the strategies of all players.
A state st is a snapshot of the game and is given by a tuple (Qt, it, pt, At).
History h is a complete record of actions – we actually use only a small
part of this information. Technically let t1, t2, ... be points in time such that
stk = st 6= stk+1 for all tk < t < tk+1 . Then h = {stk}k. Let ht be a
truncation of history up to time t. There is a one-to-one correspondence
between history truncations and decision nodes in the game tree. We will
identify subgames by truncated histories. Let σ|ht denote the restriction of
strategy σ to the subgame ht.
There is no guarantee that the game ends, that all players quit. We
therefore specify the payoffs for coalitions Qk embedded in an incomplete
partition Q. We take a conservative approach: players only receive their
guaranteed payoff, the lowest value the coalition can obtain in a partition
embedding the coalition structure of departed players:
V (Qk,Q) =
minP⊃Q V (Qk,P) Qk ∈ Q0 otherwise. (3.1)
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For instance in Example 2 the departure of a singleton, say player 1 results
in a simple majority residual game. For such games no stationary equilibria
exist and so the bargaining will be inconclusive, but we can allocate the
minimum achievable payoff U({1} , [1]) = minP3[1] {U({1} ,P)} = 1 to this
player – which is incidentally also the maximum, as in this case the payoff of
this player does not depend on what happens in the rest of the game.
Given a strategy profile σ the payoff of player i is xi(σ).
3.2 Equilibria
Now that we have specified the available strategies (actions) and the resulting
payoffs (incentives), we can focus on the outcomes of the coalition formation
game. We hope to answer two questions simultaneously: (i) which coalitions
will form (ii) how are coalitional payoffs distributed.
Recall that players are conservative and only go for certain profits: If
different beliefs lead to different subsequent actions from the other players,
a deviation may or may not be profitable under all such scenarios.
Definition 2. The strategy profile σ∗ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if for
all h ∈ H, time t, i ∈ N , strategies σi the corresponding restrictions σ∗|ht
and σi|ht to the subgame at ht we have
xi(σ
∗|ht) ≥ xi(σi|ht , σ∗−i|ht). (3.2)
The set of perfect equilibria may be too inclusive (see Muthoo (1990,
1995); Perry and Reny (1994); Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for a discus-
sion of folk-theorem-like results) so we focus on stationary strategies.
Definition 3. A strategy σ is stationary if it does not depend on time.
Formally: if for all h and t1, t2 with h
t1 = ht2 we have σ|ht1 = σ|ht2 .
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Definition 4. A stationary perfect equilibrium σ∗ is a strategy profile that
is both subgame-perfect and stationary.
For games with nonempty residual cores the set of stationary perfect
equilibrium partitions coincide with the recursive core (Ko´czy, 2009). This
equivalence result predicts that games containing empty residual cores do
not have stationary perfect equilibria.
Bloch (1996) presents a 3-player example, where player 1 would like to
form a coalition with 2, 2 with 3, 3 with 1. This game does not have
stationary-perfect equilibria. Since residual games are also partition func-
tion form games, the smallest residual game for which the corresponding
subgame of the sequential game has no stationary strategies has an empty
core. By a sufficiently large payoff for the grand coalition the core of the
original game is nevertheless empty. Perfectness only holds globally, that is,
if the tiniest subgame fails to have stationary perfect equilibria this failure
extends to the entire game. On the other hand, just as the recursive core
may be non-empty even if the game has empty residual cores, with a weaker
concept of perfection we may retain an essentially perfect behaviour in the
corresponding sequential coalition formation games, too.
Time-consistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) requires the equilibrium
strategy to be consistent or revision-free and is therefore unaffected by empty
cores elsewhere. Most subgames are never reached anyway so following this
promising direction for weakening subgame perfectness we are focussing on
the immediate neighbourhood of the equilibrium play σ. A strategy profile
is in this immediate neigbourhood if it is an elementary deviation from σ,
that is, it only differs in the action of a single player in a single decision
node. Subgame-consistency, that we introduce below, is such that the per-
fectness/consistency criterion is only required in relevant subgames. What
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is relevant?
Definition 5. For a strategy profile σ a subgame at t is relevant if
1. it is the original game (t = 0),
2. it can be reached via an elementary profitable deviation from σ, or
3. it is a relevant subgame of a relevant subgame.
Let σ|h denote the truncation of σ to the subgame corresponding to h.
Definition 6. The strategy profile σ∗ is a subgame-consistent equilibrium if
for all relevant subgames ht, i ∈ N , strategies σi the corresponding restric-
tions σ∗|ht and σi|ht to ht we have
xi(σ
∗|ht) ≥ xi(σi|ht , σ∗−i|ht). (3.3)
For an equilibrium strategy profile, this requires checking the equilibrium
path only: Since no profitable deviation exist, other subgames need not be
checked. Were there profitable deviations they would have to be supported
by a strategy that is subgame perfect along that strategy. The equilibrium
in Example 2 is to propose and accept the core payoff configuration. We
must of course check possible deviations, but if a particular deviation cannot
possibly be profitable irrespective of what happens in the rest of the game,
it is actually unnecessary to check what would happen there. As such, since
player 1 can never get more than 2, so there is no need to evaluate the
(problematic) subgame induced by its departure.
Clearly, subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are also subgame-consistent.
3.3 Alternative histories
For a general implementation result we seek equilibrium strategy profiles
that produce core outcomes. In Subsection 3.2 we have solved the issue due
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Figure 1: Stationary strategies cannot react to different histories.
to empty residual cores, here we describe and solve another problem due to
stationarity.
Consider Example 1 again. As we have seen it, in equilibrium players get a
payoff of 2 each. We, however, consider the scenario when the partition [1, 23]
has already been formed. What is the strategy for the remaining players and
in particular: what will be the payoff of 1, 2, and 3? In the cooperative
game the reaction depends on the history that has led to this state. If [1]
deviated first, then in the induced subgame players 2 to 5 should have formed
the “grand coalition” in this game. This would give player 1 a payoff of 1
that would make the deviation non-profitable. In this smaller grand coalition
players 2 and 3 would get a payoff of 2 each and leave the game prematurely
only if they are sure to obtain more. In the cooperative game their departure
is followed by the formation of a residual payoff configuration; here coalition
{2, 3} fears that the partition [45, 6] emerges giving a lower payoff than in the
residual grand coalition. Since the core includes payoff configurations with
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this partition, it would make sense for the players 4,5 and 6 to choose this
strategy. Except that there is another possibility. Perhaps it is 2 and 3 that
said first no to the original proposal and left. The equilibrium answer was
then subsequently sabotaged by 1, who would have a payoff of 1, but now
hopes to get 3. We are, again in the same subgame, but in the cooperative
game we now look at residual core-supporting partitions that are bad for [1],
such as [4, 56]. Note that [45, 6], what was the only good partition before,
does not work here. For the last deviation by {1, 2, 3} to form partition [1, 23]
either of the two strategies would “work”, but otherwise the equilibrium
strategy seems to depend on the history.
When looking at the sequential game we must explicitly determine which
equilibrium strategy responds to a particular history, which equilibrium strat-
egy can render the same deviations non-profitable. When looking at station-
ary strategies, history is masked from the players, who only see the current
state of the game. At some point players may see a state that is very differ-
ent from the equilibrium play. What is the equilibrium that prevents such
deviations?
Before elaborating on this issue we must stress that in the sequential
coalition formation game players do not “respond” to formed coalitions and
especially not punish those. On the other hand there may be different strate-
gies that constitute equilibrium behaviour in a given subgame and we are
interested in those that contribute to stability in the larger game, too.
Although players do not know the history, given the current state s they
can reconstruct one of the possible histories h(s) satisfying sh
t(s) = s for some
t. This history h(s) provides a plausible, but not necessarily true explanation
of the current state. Let H(s) = {h ∣∣∃t : sht = s} be the set of plausible
histories to the current state s.
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Figure 2: Stationary decision with possible histories
In Example 1 the existing partition [1, 23] is possible with – essentially –
three different histories. Since 4, 5 and 6 do not know which of these is the
true one, they make up a history and follow the strategy conditional on that.
Unfortunately in a stationary process these possible histories only pro-
vide a temporary explanation as they get forgotten, too. We assume that h
is arbitrarily regenerated when the partition Qt changes, that is, each time
some players quit the game. It is common knowledge among the remaining
players, who choose their strategies treating h as the true history, but taking
into account that future deviations may generate a new alternative history.
“History” is not preserved, subsequent alternative histories are totally unre-
lated, it may well be that the current state will not have happened at all. Let
H(σ) denote the set of all possible histories happening as σ is played (and
there are no deviations). Finally H(σ, s) ⊆ H(σ) ∩ H(s) denotes the set of
possible histories passing through s when σ is played after s is reached. Let
us stress that many of the h ∈ H(σ, s) will believe that s did not exist at all,
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but at s players are aware of their limited rationality in the future.
The coalitional payoffs are not related to history and are thus unaf-
fected, but what happens to the payoff of the individual players? In the
non-stationary game players can calculate the payoffs by just looking at the
strategies. With stationarity we must take the subsequent updating of the
history into account. The subsequent development of the game therefore
depends on the current state s – in particular, the partition Q – and the
strategy restricted to this subgame. Since we focus on stationary strategies
it is sufficient to say that these strategies are restricted to a subgame s.
Then the subsequent development of history depends on some strategy σ|s
restricted to s. Let x(σ, h) ∈ RN denote the vector of payoffs in case σ is
played along the history h. Then the payoff players can expect is
x(σ, s) = min
h∈H(σ,s)
x(σ, h). (3.4)
Note the pessimism of the players. When uncertain about the subse-
quent development of the game, they assume that the remaining players will
fabricate histories that are the least favourable to them. While subgame per-
fectnes can be formulated with these expectations, too, the resulting equilib-
ria are different in general. Since the additional “information” comes from the
past, the concepts of stationarity and stationary equilibria are not affected,
the stationary equilibria remain the same and the recursive core equivalence
result remains valid. Likewise, subgame consistency can be redefined in this
environment, but we first clarify what is a relevant subgame.
Definition 7. For a strategy profile σ a subgame at ht is relevant if
1. it is the original game (Qht = ∅),
2. there exists an elementary deviation σ′ producing Q′ such that
xi(σ, s
ht) < xi(σ
′,Q′,∅), (3.5)
15
3. or it is a relevant subgame of a relevant subgame.
The subgame-consistency is accordingly modified replacing h by an arbi-
trary (compatible) history h(s) in Inequality 3.3 and payoffs are now given
by Equation 3.4 and are conditional on the current s via the different updates
of made-up history.
xi(σ
∗|ht(s), s) ≥ xi(σi|ht(s), σ∗−i|ht(s), s). (3.6)
The condition becomes clear now: it has implications not so much for the
present, but for the reactions of the remaining players.
Let σ be a stationary strategy and σ|s its restriction to a state s.
A stationary consistent equilibrium σ∗ is a strategy profile that is both
subgame-consistent and stationary, that is, if for all relevant subgames cor-
responding to some s we have
xi(σ
∗|s, s) ≥ xi(σi|s, σ∗−i|s, s). (3.7)
We denote the set of stationary consistent equilibria by SCE(N, V ) and
outcomes resulting from playing such equilibrium strategies by Ω∗(N, V ).
4 Results
Theorem 1. Let (N, V ) be a partition function form game. Then its recur-
sive core C(N, V ) coincides with the set Ω∗(N, V ) of outcomes supported by
stationary consistent equilibrium strategy profiles.
The rest of this section is devoted to the inductive proof of this theorem.
As the proof is long, we break it into a number of propositions and finally
present a summary of these results. The first proposition requires no proof:
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Proposition 2. Let ({1} , V ) be a trivial, single-player partition function
form game. Then C({1} , V ) = Ω∗({1} , V ).
Now assume that Theorem 1 holds for all games with less than k players.
In the following we extend it to games with k players. In order to show
Ω∗(N, V ) = C(N, V ), first we show Ω∗(N, V ) ⊆ C(N, V ) then Ω∗(N, V ) ⊇
C(N, V ).
Lemma 3. If Theorem 1 holds for all games with up to k − 1 players,
Ω∗(N, V ) ⊆ C(N, V ) for all k-player games.
Proof. If Ω∗(N, V ) = ∅ the result is trivial, otherwise there exists a SCE
σ producing ω(σ, h) = (x(σ, h),P(σ, h)) ∈ Ω∗(N, V ) for some sequence of
possible histories h ∈ H(σ,∅). In particular, we assume that ω(σ, h) 6∈
C(N, V ) and prove contradiction.
By this assumption there exists a profitable deviation D by some set D
of players. By this we really mean a deviation by a single player i ∈ D that
results in the departure of D, that is, in a state s′ with Qs′ = D, where,
without loss of generality, we assume that the deviation occurs at s when
no other players have yet left the game. The induced subgame has fewer
players so the inductive assumption can be applied. In the sequential game
the deviation at ht is expressed by the strategy profile σ′ = (σi|−ht , σ′i|ht , σ−i)
differing only for i and only in the subgame ht. We discuss three cases.
Case 1. For the strategy profile σ′ the subgame at D is not relevant.
Then for all σ−i there exists i ∈ D and h′ ∈ H(σ′, s′) such that xi(σ′, h′) <
xi(σ, h) – thus the deviation cannot be profitable in the cooperative game;
contradiction.
Case 2. The subgame is relevant, the core of the corresponding residual
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subgame is empty. Then V (D,D ∪D) >∑i∈S xi(σ, h) for all D ∈ Π(D). As
V (D,D ∪D) = min
h′∈H(σ′,D)
∑
i∈S
xi(σ
′, h′),
a player i in D should immediately propose to form D. By subgame con-
sistency all in D will accept. Therefore σ is not a stationary consistent
equilibrium, moreover the outcome ω(σ, h) cannot be supported by other
equilibria either. Contradiction.
Case 3. The induced subgame is relevant and the core of the correspond-
ing residual subgame is not empty. Since σ is a SCE its restriction σ|s to
this relevant subgame s is stationary consistent, too. Moreover the deviation
from σ to form D is not profitable, therefore
xD(σ|s, s) ≥ xD(σ′|s′ , s′) (4.1)
On the other hand, by the inductive assumption,
ω(σ′|s′ , s′) ∈ C(D, V D). (4.2)
This, however, implies that the deviation D is not profitable in the coopera-
tive game; contradiction.
We have discussed all cases, and found the assumptions contradicting.
Therefore ω(σ,H) ∈ C(N, V ).
Punishment strategy Before we move on to our next lemma, we specify a
“response” to each deviation that turns these deviations unprofitable. In the
recursive core a deviation is only profitable if it represents an improvement
in the payoffs for all residual assumptions. In a game (N, V ) the core is
nonempty if for all outcomes (x,P) ∈ C(N, V ) and for all deviations D there
exists an outcome (yD,D) ∈ Ω(D, V D) such that
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1. there exists D1 ∈ D such that
∑
i∈D1 xi ≥ V (D1,D ∪D) and
2. (yD,D) ∈ C(D, V D) if C(D, V D) 6= ∅.
Generally, for a residual game (S, V S) the response to D is denoted as
(xS(D),S(D)).
In the sequential game, there may be equilibrium strategies for the sub-
game that make the deviation D unattractive. Such strategies deserve special
attention as these help to preserve the equilibrium in the greater game. We
call these strategies “punishment strategies” although – recall – these players
do not react to the deviation, as such, but simply play an equilibrium that
works. Note that finding the right punishment can be quite difficult.
In the following we specify the punishment strategy to a deviation know-
ing that some other coalitions left, too. We assume that Q has already left
the game, but Q˜ ⊆ Q was (or at least Q think it was) the last to exit. In the
partition function form game (Q \ Q˜, V Q\Q˜) the partition Q˜, as a deviation,
defines a residual game (Q, V Q), where the response to Q˜ is (xQ(Q˜),Q(Q˜)).
Lemma 4. If Theorem 1 holds for all games with less than k players, then
Ω∗(N, V ) ⊇ C(N, V ) for all k-player games (N, V ).
Proof. The proof is partly inspired by Bloch’s (1996, Proposition 3.2), and is
by construction. We show that if (x∗,P∗) ∈ C(N, V ) there exists a stationary
consistent strategy profile σ∗ such that for all for all possible histories h ∈
H(σ∗,∅) we have ω(σ∗, h) ∈ C(N, V ).
In the following we define the stationary strategy σ∗i for player i. Due
to stationarity it is sufficient to specify the strategy for each triple (Q, Q˜, p)
consisting of the partition of players who have already quit, the subpartition
consisting of the coalitions that left last according to the current made-up
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history and the current proposal p = (T , w). Then the strategy of player i
is given as
σ∗i (Q, Q˜, T , w) =

accept if xi(σ
∗,Q∪ T ,∅) > xi(σ∗,Q,∅)(
P∗, x∗|x∗|
)
if T = Q = ∅(
Q(Q˜), xQ(Q˜)|xQ(Q˜)|
)
if T = ∅, but Q 6= ∅
wait otherwise.
(4.3)
In equilibrium P(σ∗) = P∗ and the strategy is stationary by construction
so we only need to verify subgame-consistency. We show this by induction.
As subgame-consistency holds for a trivial game we may assume that it holds
for all games of size less than |N |.
Now consider game (N, V ) and observe that if Q departed to form Q the
subgame is simply a coalition formation game with less players. We discuss
two cases based on the emptiness of the residual core.
1. If the residual core is not empty, the proposed strategy exhibits the
same similarity property: in equilibrium the core partition is proposed and
accepted, while residual cores form off-equilibrium.
The inductive assumption then ensures that the off-equilibrium path is
subgame-consistent so we only need to check whether a deviation Q˜ is ever
accepted. This deviation corresponds to a deviation in the partition function
game. Since (x∗,P∗) ∈ C(N, V ), by the construction of
(
Q(Q˜), xQ(Q˜)|xQ(Q˜)|
)
we
know that for some history h(Q) there exists a player in Q˜ for whom the
deviation Q˜ is not profitable. Given the pessimism of the players, this is
sufficient to deter this player from accepting the proposal to deviate.
2. The emptiness of the residual core, by our assumption, implies that
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there are no stationary consistent equilibrium strategy profiles. In the ab-
sence of such strategy profiles the strategy σ∗ will be abandoned and so
the players in Q˜ cannot predict the partition of Q – in this case, by Ex-
pression 3.1, they, individually, expect the worst. As Q˜ only forms if it is
a profitable deviation, that is, only if xi(σ
∗, h) is an improvement for all
h ∈ H(σ∗,Q,∅). Since (x∗,P∗) ∈ C(N, V ) this is not the case. This, implies
that post-deviation subgame is not relevant. Also, the formation of P∗ is un-
affected by possible deviations in this subgame, meeting the first condition
of subgame-consistency.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by induction. The result holds for trivial,
single-player games. Assuming that the result holds for all k−1 player games,
the result for k-player games is a corollary of Lemmata 3 & 4.
5 Conclusion
Theorem 1 holds for arbitrary games in discrete partition function form, but
of course it is most interesting for games where some of the residual cores
contain payoff configurations with different partitions or are empty. When
a proposal is made in a game without externalities the invited players do
not even (need to) consider the residual game and therefore the emptiness
of a residual core is not addressed. Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m (2006) and Ko´czy
(2009) focus on games where the residual cores are non-empty, in fact the
r-core (Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2003) is not even defined for games with empty
residual cores. As already pointed out by Ko´czy (2007) this is not only an
enormous limitation given the number of conditions such games must satisfy
(one for each residual game), but the definitions/results do not apply to
some games without externalities and so they are not generalisations of the
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well-known results for TU-games. The present paper heals this deficiency.
We have already indicated in our introduction the similarity with the
results by Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m (2010). While Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m (2010)
insist on totally r-balanced games, the main conceptual difference seems to
be the way alternative histories are handled. Their solution is admittedly
elegant and simple: the process “remembers” the coalition that deviated
last. When subgame perfect equilibria exist, we can basically say that the
remaining players can select a retaliation to punish this coalition. In contrast
we insist on the memoryless nature of the process: no information on past
actions is kept, only the result of the actions. Instead, players have a common
understanding of what may have happened in the past and react to that.
Given the conservativism of the players it is enough if the players in the
subgame get it right occasionally. This approach is more in line with the
recursive definition of the recursive core, where the residual game is a game
on its own: influenced by the deviating coalitions, but played independently
of these.
If the concept is a generalisation of the core for TU-games, it is natural
to ask how our game proceeds in the special case when the partition function
form game at hand is actually a TU-game as it does not have externali-
ties. In the absence of externalities, there is no way to “punish” deviating
coalitions as their payoff does not depend on the partition of the remaining
players. Since there are no punishments, any strategy profile resulting in a
core outcome in the remaining game will equally be a punishment strategy
and therefore considering alternative histories does not really have a bite
here.
Similarly, the expectation that the residual players will form a residual
core outcome does not influence the decisions of active players: their payoff
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will not depend on the coalitions formed in the residual game. Perry and
Reny (1994) study market games (Shapley and Shubik, 1969), which are
totally-balanced. For such games the “residual core” is always non-empty and
therefore i) the game always terminates with all players leaving the game and
ii) there always exist stationary perfect equilibria. For such games subgame
consistency and subgame perfectness coincide and so the two procedures
provide the same implementation.
A The core of the game in Example 1
In the following we present the calculations to determine the core of the game
in Example 1.
Firstly note that the game is cohesive: the payoff of the grand coalition
is strictly the highest among all partitions and therefore all core payoff-
configurations must have the grand coalition as partition. It is also clear
that no player can have a payoff greater than 2 as any five players can obtain
10 by deviating – in this case the residual game is trivial – and therefore
all players must have a payoff of 2 exactly. Therefore the core is a subset
of {((2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2), [123456])}, are there other deviations that would make it
empty? In the following we look at all deviations that may be profitable.
Consider a deviation by player 1. In order to determine its payoff we must
first evaluate the induced residual game This deviation leads to the following
residual game:
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V [1]([23456]) = (10)
V [1]([i, 23456 \ i]) = (1, 8) ∀i ∈ N \ {1}
V [1]([23, 456]) = (6, 3)
V [1]([23, 4, 56]) = (6, 1, 2)
V [1]([23, 5, 46]) = (6, 1, 2)
V [1]([23, 6, 45]) = (2, 1, 2)
V [1]([23, 4, 5, 6]) = (6, 0, 0, 0)
other payoffs are 0.
This game is also cohesive and any four players can get 8, so the candidate
for the residual core is {((2, 2, 2, 2, 2), [23456])}. No single-player deviation
can be profitable, however a deviation by {2, 3} can lead to a payoff of 2 or
6 depending on what happens in the induced residual game.
V [1,23]([456]) = (3)
V [1,23]([i, jk]) = (1, 2) ∀ {i, j, k} = {4, 5, 6}
V [1,23]([4, 5, 6]) = (0, 0, 0).
This game is also cohesive, but not strictly. Any pair can obtain a payoff of
2, but not more. It is easy to verify that the core consists of the following
payoff configurations
{((1, 1, 1), [456]), ((1, 1, 1), [4, 56]), ((1, 1, 1), [5, 46]), ((1, 1, 1), [6, 45])} .
So what does this imply for {2, 3}? Their initial restricted payoff vector
is (2, 2) and the payoff of their coalition is 6, 6, 6, 2 respectively for the
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different residual core partitions. The recursive core assumes that players are
pessimistic: unless the deviation is profitable under all circumstances it does
not go through. Note that no other deviation promises to be profitable, so
{((2, 2, 2, 2, 2), [23456])} is undominated. Then the payoff of 1 in the primary
deviation is 1 and therefore the deviation is not profitable.
We do not need to look at residual subgames where the deviating coalition
can never have a payoff higher than the total payoff obtained under the core
(that is: 2). This includes all other singletons and in fact all other coalitions
except for the pair [23].
A deviation by [23] gives
V [23]([1456]) = (4)
V [23]([1, 456]) = (1, 3)
V [23]([1, 4, 56]) = (0, 1, 2)
V [23]([1, 5, 46]) = (2, 1, 2)
V [23]([1, 6, 45]) = (3, 1, 2)
V [23]([1, 4, 5, 6]) = (3, 0, 0, 0)
other payoffs are 0. We show that the core includes {((1, 1, 1, 1), [1456]) ,
((1, 1, 1, 1), [1, 456]), ((0, 1, 1, 1), [1, 4, 56]), ((2, 1, 1, 1), [1, 5, 46]), ((3, 1, 1, 1), [1, 6, 45])}.
The only deviation that could challenge such outcomes is by the singleton [1].
(We make the – somewhat debatable – assumption that a subset of the cur-
rent partition may also deviate.). We have already studied the induced sub-
game V [1,23] above and found that the core consists of the following payoff con-
figurations {((1, 1, 1), [456]), ((1, 1, 1), [4, 56]), ((1, 1, 1), [5, 46]), ((1, 1, 1), [6, 45])}.
A pessimistic player 1 will then expect a payoff of 0 that is no improvement.
At last we must also look for coalitions that deviate by forming a –
non-trivial – partition. Here the deviation is profitable even if only one
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of the coalitions has a higher total payoff as long as none of the other coali-
tions loose payoff. We only need to look at the coalition {1, 2, 3} forming
a partition [1, 23]. We have already looked at the induced residual game
({4, 5, 6} , V [1,23]), found that (1) the core is not empty, and (2) for some core
elements the deviation is unworthy therefore, under pessimism the deviation
is not profitable.
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